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The Kyoto Protocol sets reduction targets to greenhouse gas emission levels in developed 
countries, including OECD and East European countries (the so-called Annex 1 Parties to the 
Climate Change Convention). The Kyoto Protocol gives Annex 1 countries considerable flexibility 
in the choice of domestic policies to meet their emissions commitments. Possible climate policies 
include carbon/energy taxes, subsidies, energy efficiency standards, eco-labels, and government 
procurement policies. In order to meet their Kyoto targets with minimum adverse effects on their 
economies, Annex 1 Party governments with differentiated legal and political systems are highly 
likely to pursue climate policies that may have the potential to bring them into conflict with their 
WTO obligations. This paper explores the potential interaction between these domestic climate 
policies and WTO rules. It argues that their potential conflicts can be avoided or at least 
minimized if WTO rules are carefully scrutinized, and efforts are made early on to ensure that the 
proposed climate policies comply with them. It suggests an early process of pursuing consultations 
between WTO members and the Parties to the Climate Change Convention and points to the need 




I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Climate change as a result of increased atmospheric concentrations of the so-called greenhouse 
gases is an externality. To date, such an externality has not been internalized in production processes, 
input costs, consumer choices and energy markets. The continuous unconstrained reliance on fossil 
fuels bears witness to the neglect of the climate change externality: current energy policies fail to 
consider the costs of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level which 
would prevent potential catastrophic damages (and hence future economic costs). Part of the reason 
for this policy failure resides in the fact that climate change has so far been treated as an isolated 
environmental issue, whereas climate change is essentially a cross-sectoral economic problem. Given 
the multitude of greenhouse gas emission sources in both developed and developing economies, policy 
responses will require a fundamental change in the way that energy is produced and the way it is used. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) marks the first step towards an international determination to limit emissions of 
greenhouse gases. It is widely regarded as an important mechanism towards correcting the climate 
policy failure and a major push towards the internalization of the climate change externality. The 
Protocol has set legally binding reduction targets and timetables on greenhouse gas emissions for 
Annex 1 countries (i.e. the OECD countries and countries in transition to a market economy)
1 and 
                                                 
* Lucas Assunção is Coordinator, Climate Change and BIOTRADE Initiative Programmes,  United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switzerland. ZhongXiang Zhang is a professor of economics, 
East-West Center, Honolulu, USA;  Centre for Environment and Development, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, Beijing, China; and China Centre for Regional Economic Research, Peking University, Beijing, China. 
1 The Kyoto Protocol includes a basket of six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The Protocol 
will become effective once it is ratified by no less than 55 per cent of the parties whose CO2 emissions represent 
at least 55 per cent of the total from Annex 1 countries in the year 1990.  For the latest list of ratifications, see 




introduced three international flexibility mechanisms, namely i) international emissions trading, 
ii) joint implementation, and iii) the clean development mechanism (CDM). However, the Articles 
defining the flexibility mechanisms carry wording that their use must be supplemental to domestic 
actions. This has led to the open debates on interpretations of these supplementarity provisions.
2 With 
the United States withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, the European Union dropped its 
previous insistence on a cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms to secure the reluctant support of 
other Umbrella Group
3 members of the Protocol at the resumed sixth Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC, held in Bonn, July 2001. The final wording of the Bonn Agreement, reaffirmed in the 
Marrakech Accords, is now that “domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the 
effort made by each Party included in Annex 1 to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments”. This at least indicates that domestic climate policies will have an important role to 
play in meeting Annex 1 countries’ emissions commitments. 
 
Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol gives Annex 1 countries considerable flexibility in the choice of 
domestic policies to meet their emissions commitments. Possible climate policies include 
carbon/energy taxes, subsidies, energy efficiency standards, eco-labels, and government procurement 
policies. In order to meet their Kyoto emissions targets with minimum adverse effects on their 
economies, it is highly likely that Annex 1 governments with differentiated legal and political systems 
might pursue emission reduction policies in such a way as to unfairly favour domestic producers over 
foreign ones. Such differential treatments could occur in governing eligibility for, and the amount of, the 
subsidy, in establishing energy efficiency standards, in the determination of the category of eco-
labelled products and the procedures of establishing eco-labels, in specification criteria for tenders, 
and in specifying condition for participating in government procurement bids. In the case where a 
country unilaterally imposes a carbon tax, it may adjust taxes at the border to mitigate the competitive 
effects of cheaper imports that are not subject to a similar level of the carbon tax in the country of 
origin. A measure of this sort may well raise complex questions with respect to the WTO consistency 
and the conditions under which border taxes can be adjusted to accommodate a loss of international 
competitiveness. All this clearly indicates that these domestic climate policies may have the potential 
to bring countries into conflict with their WTO obligations. 
 
However, Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC states the underlying principle that “measures taken to 
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”. It is again carefully 
restated in Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol.
4 Thus, the real challenge for a country being both a WTO 
member and a Party to the Kyoto Protocol is to pursue both the Uruguay Round and Kyoto Protocol 
objectives through enhancement of synergy among policies and avoidance of conflict arising from 
unilateral discriminatory trade measures. After all, a conflict between the trade and climate regimes, if 
it breaks out, helps neither trade nor the global climate. 
 
To date, however, such desirable policy coordination between the two regimes has not been 
addressed in a sufficiently serious manner. This paper aims to fill this gap by discussing carbon/energy 
                                                 
2 See Zhang (2000, 2001) for a detailed discussion on these supplementarity provisions and on the assessment of 
the European Union proposal for ceilings on the use of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. 
3 The Umbrella Group refers to the so-called JUSSCANNZ countries (Japan, the United States, Switzerland, 
Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand). It meets daily during the international climate change negotiations to 
exchange information and discuss substance/strategy on issues where there is common ground. 
4 Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol states that “The Parties included in Annex 1 shall strive to implement policies 
and measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects on international trade, and social, 
environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties and in particular 




taxes, subsidies, energy efficiency standards, eco-labels, government procurement policies, and 
exploring the potential interaction between these domestic climate policies and WTO rules.
5 It 
highlights their potential conflicts, and argues that such conflicts can be avoided or at least minimized 
if WTO rules are carefully scrutinized, and efforts are made early on to ensure that the proposed 
climate policies comply with them. It suggests an early process of pursuing consultations between 
WTO members and the Parties to the Climate Change Convention and points to the need of further 




II.   SUBSIDIES 
 
 
Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the Subsidies Agreement), a 
subsidy is defined as a financial contribution and/or a benefit conferred by a government to its 
domestic industries so that a given sector can develop with (temporary) lower production costs and 
improve its competitiveness. More specifically, it can take the form of direct transfers, loan 
guarantees, fiscal incentives such as tax credits, provision of goods and services other than general 
infrastructure, or direct payments to a funding mechanism. In the context of combating global climate 
change, the possibilities for fuel substitution and technical innovation are essential to the success of 
Annex 1 countries meeting their national emissions targets. However, clean technologies are relatively 
capital and knowledge-intensive, and  renewable technologies are not yet competitive with 
conventional technologies. Thus, it is most likely that Annex 1 governments may use either of the 
above subsidy options or a combination of these options to promote energy conservation, the use of 
renewable energy, and/or the increased adoption of less carbon-emitting technologies. By encouraging 
producers to take environmentally beneficial actions, such subsidies contribute positively to the 
environment.
6 In the economic jargon, these subsidies “capture positive environmental externalities”, 
in the sense that they would promote production with lower greenhouse gas emission levels. 
 
It is conceivable that in introducing subsidy incentives to domestic firms, governments will 
obviously attempt to foster industrial development and, at the same time, achieve reductions in present 
or future greenhouse gas emissions. However, if the sector where such subsidies are introduced is 
significantly open to foreign trade, such subsidies could potentially be challenged under WTO rules. 
The question is then the conditions under which such subsidies would run against WTO rules. 
 
Article 3.1 of the Subsidies Agreement prohibits government subsidies that are contingent on 
export performance or use of domestic over imported products. Subsidies of this sort are prohibited 
regardless of whether they are applied generally or to specific industries and regardless of whether 
they are going to cause adverse effects to foreign competitors or not. Accordingly, subsidies made 
available for firms to use domestic low carbon-emitting products over foreign, high carbon-emitting 
                                                 
5 This paper focuses exclusively on the relationship between domestic climate policies and WTO rules (see also 
Assunção (2000)). For a discussion on the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions trading and WTO 
rules, see Zhang (1998), Parker (1998), Petsonk (1999), Werksman (1999). 
6 Subsidies could also contribute negatively to the environment. The typical example is energy and transport 
subsidies, which are widely considered to distort trade, and in most instances to cause environmental 
degradation. Thus, reforming energy and transport subsidies and getting the price right to reflect their production 
cost and environmental externality is the win-win strategy that first needs to be pursued in mitigating carbon 
emissions. For example, OECD (1997c) estimates that subsidy reform could deliver 1–8 per cent CO2 emission 
reductions in the energy and electricity sector and 10–15 per cent emission reductions in the transport sector 




“like products” are considered GATT-illegal. A subsidy is actionable if it is granted to certain 
enterprises only and if it causes injury to the domestic industry of another member or serious prejudice 
to the interests of another member (Article 5 of the Subsidies Agreement). Put in another way, a 
subsidy is actionable if it is found either de jure or de facto specific and if it causes injury or serious 
prejudice to the economic interests of foreign competitors. 
 
Let us first examine the specificity requirement. Under Article 2.1(a) of the Subsidies 
Agreement, a subsidy is considered de jure specific if only “certain” enterprises are eligible. Aimed at 
helping reduce carbon emissions, climate change-related subsidies are most likely to be granted to few 
energy-intensive sectors rather than made available economy-wide. Thus, they could be challenged 
under the de jure specificity requirement of the Subsidies Agreement. If they are found to be de jure 
specific, the specificity analysis terminates. However, even if they pass the de jure specificity test, 
they could still be considered specific under the de facto specificity if it is found that there is a 
predominant use or a disproportionate use of such subsidies. For example, in the case of Dutch 
Flowers, a subsidy scheme nominally available to all agricultural producers was found not de jure 
specific. But the subsidies received by horticulture firms were deemed de facto specific because 
horticulture received 50 per cent of the subsidy, while accounting for only 24 per cent of Dutch 
agricultural production (quoted in Parker (1998)). 
 
Because the Subsidies Agreement is intentionally vague on how the “certain enterprises” is to 
be interpreted, to ascertain whether a subsidy is specific in practice or not requires a case-by-case 
analysis. Experience shows that this is not an easy matter. However, to determine the extent of injury 
that a subsidy might cause is even more difficult. Under Article 15.1 of the Subsidies Agreement, 
determination of injury is to be based on “positive evidence and involve an objective examination of 
both (a) the volume of the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the 
domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic 
producers of such products” (WTO, 1995). Although in practice providing the objective investigation 
of adverse effects is rather complicated, it would not prevent a country home to foreign competitor’s 
products from initiating a WTO dispute if it estimates that the subsidy impairs its market share or 
discriminates against its exports. It is indeed conceivable that in key economic sectors several of the 
subsidy schemes currently envisaged to reduce specific industries’ greenhouse gas emissions would run 
against WTO rules. Potential conflict with trade rules could then become a reality and a real obstacle to 
successful climate change policy and compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. This risk of conflict will be 
higher, depending on how relevant a certain sector is for Annex 1 Party emission reductions and how 
significant trade flows are in that specific sector. 
 
Evidently, any discussion on subsidies and their potential conflict with WTO rules will need to be 
updated in response to ongoing trade negotiations of the Subsidies Agreement mandated by the WTO 
Doha Ministerial Declaration which was adopted on 14 November 2001. In this respect, even though one 
could argue that the Subsidies Agreement might be revised (including some of its current outstanding 
clauses that were to be renewed by WTO members in Seattle and in Doha) the discussion below remains 
relevant as domestic climate policies will undoubtedly make use of domestic subsidies to meet their 
Kyoto targets. Under the now-expired Article 8.2(c) of the Subsidies Agreement, there was a particular 
type of subsidy which would be non-actionable and consistent with WTO rules. Such sub-article 
constituted an exception allowing for a one-time subsidy introduced to offset increases in production 
costs of firms adjusting to new environmental regulations. However, and even in its now expired form, 
such an exception clause imposed limitations to the use of subsidies for climate change purposes. For 




per cent of the adaptation costs incurred.
7 If re-instated in its original or in a modified form, this subsidy 
exception could be quite useful for mitigating economic effects of undertaking climate actions, 
particularly in helping domestic industrial firms to adjust to the “first shock” resulting from the Kyoto 
Protocol implementation. A concrete example could be a subsidy to encourage industry sectors to adopt 
new combined heat and power facilities, which have significant emissions reduction potential.
8 Such a 
subsidy measure to increase industrial co-generation would be WTO-legal
9 and at the same time, be a 
highly cost-effective means of reducing CO2 emissions from industry. However, this kind of measure 
would be only one component of a country’s comprehensive greenhouse gas reduction strategy. 
Currently, there seems to exist a sort of gentleman’s agreement no to challenge this type of subsidies. 
With the imminent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, it would be important to revisit the possibility of 
re-instating a similar exception clause in the Subsidies Agreement. 
 
If and when WTO members acknowledge the fundamentally economic nature of the Climate 
Change Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, other types of non-actionable subsidies could be allowed, 
possibly through an interpretative statement, or re-instatement, of Article 8.2(c) of the Subsidies 
Agreement. The so-called ex ante approaches were proposed by some WTO members in the lead up to 
the WTO ministerial conferences at Singapore (December 1996) and Seattle (November 1999), to 
mean that rules and procedures are established to prevent a dispute from arising in the first place by 
amending the GATT or by adopting an Understanding on the interpretation of GATT (Ewing and 
Tarasofsky, 1997; Schwartz, 2000). In this respect, the fact should be highlighted that the negotiations 
on WTO rules under the Doha Round will be addressing the Subsidies Agreement and this could be an 
important and timely opportunity to ensure its compatibility with the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, it 
might be of great policy relevance to draft a non-binding Understanding on the interpretation of GATT 
Article 8.2(c) in its present or future form. Such an Understanding could help clarify for dispute 
resolution panels when subsidies are not actionable. 
 
In addition to the above exception, Article 2.1(b) of the Subsidies Agreement allows for some 
additional flexibility regarding  its stern specificity rule. Under the Article, a subsidy is considered not 
“specific”, hence not actionable, if there are objective and legally enforceable criteria governing eligibility 
for, and the amount of, the subsidy and if eligibility is automatic for any company meeting the criteria. 
These criteria or conditions need to be neutral, meaning that they would not favour certain firms over 
others, and be economic in nature and horizontal in application. It could be argued that if eligibility for, 
and the amount of, a subsidy were linked directly to concrete criteria – for example energy efficiency or 
intensity – the subsidy might not be considered “specific” even if it were only applied to one firm and 
industry, and therefore be perfectly consistent with WTO rules and climate change policies. 
 
                                                 
7 Under the now expired Article 8.2 (c) of the Subsidies Agreement, assistance to promote adaptation of existing 
facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law is considered non-sanctionable, provided that it: 
(1) is a one-time non-recurring measure; (2) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; (3) does not cover 
the cost of replacing and operating the existing investment; (4) is directly linked and proportionate to 
environmental objectives and does not cover any resulting cost savings; and (5) is available to all firms which 
can adopt the new technology (WTO, 1995).  
8 IPCC (1996) estimates that the adoption of co-generation could lead to annual CO2 emissions by 2020 in the 
industrial sector 15 per cent less than what would otherwise have occurred. 
9 In this regard, it is worth mentioning state aid under Article 87 of the European Commission (EC). In order to 
ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market and true competition, the general Commission’s policy is to 
forbid all kinds of state aid. However, in the document “Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental 
Protection” recently released by the Commission, supports for co-generation and renewables are exempt from 
the general state aid regime within certain limits, thus effectively allowing the use of support schemes for these 




Moreover, Annex 1 Parties may seek to support efforts by their industries to develop climate-
friendly products and technologies through joint research and development projects like the United States 
Clean Car Initiative or incentive programs such as the United States “Golden Carrot” awards.
10 Within 
certain limits specified under Article 8.2(a) of the Subsidies Agreement, such research assistance is 
permitted by the WTO subsidy rules, although typically such measures do not seem to be too effective in 
terms of the amount of greenhouse gas emissions abated.
11 
 
From the preceding discussion, it would appear that there is a clear need for close scrutiny of WTO 
rules when Annex 1 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol formulate their climate change measures, particularly if 
they are also global players in the multilateral trading system. No doubt, a number of thorny cases will 
haunt policy makers during the Kyoto Protocol compliance phase. The first hypothetical case signals 
the possibility of an importing country imposing countervailing duties on exports from a country which 
introduced subsidies in some of its manufacturing sectors to reduce greenhouse gas emissions occurring in 
the production process of these exports. For example, if a subsidy were granted to a less carbon-
intensive fossil fuel, the products produced using that fossil fuel (in its production process) might be 
considered subsidized. From a WTO perspective, countries without an indigenous supply of either that 
fossil fuel or the subsidized product that uses it are unlikely to complain of such subsidies when 
importing either the fossil fuel or the subsidized product. However, countries that have domestic 
producers of that fossil fuel or the subsidized product may impose countervailing duties to protect 
their industries. This raises the question whether the use of countervailing duties would be the most 
appropriate solution in such cases or whether a special exception should be carved out for multilaterally-
agreed and non-discriminatory climate change measures. Some analysts argue that it might be unlikely 
that a subsidy on the embodied energy used in producing a product would make such a product 
countervailable under WTO rules. 
 
The second case relates to the lack of meaningful environmental rules in an exporting country, 
and the resulting “unfair import competition” perceived by the importing country. Under Article 1.1 of 
the Subsidies Agreement, a subsidy is defined as including “government revenue that is otherwise due 
is foregone or not collected” (WTO, 1995). Although a narrow interpretation of this clause would limit 
claims to cases in which taxes are levied but not collected, its broad interpretation would expose the 
absence of environmental taxes or regulations to charges of unfair subsidization (Esty, 1994). So 
importing countries could claim that the absence of climate change policies in their trading partners 
would be equivalent to giving an implicit unfair export subsidies biased towards their energy-intensive 
sectors (the so-called ecological dumping), because the costs of environmental degradation are not part 
of the prices of those exported products. Let alone whether such an interpretation of lax environmental 
regulation as a countervailable subsidy is acceptable,
12 imposing countervailing duties on this ground 
poses a “slippery slope” problem of where to draw an appropriate line in distinguishing desirable “like 
                                                 
10 In the United States “Golden Carrot” program, utilities offer financial incentives for manufacturers to make 
major advances in energy efficiency and product performance. In the first scheme, 24 utilities pooled US$30 
million in the Super Efficient Refrigerator Program and a competition was launched to find the m anufacturer 
who could build the most efficient CFC-free refrigerator at the lowest cost. The winner received guaranteed 
rebates from the pool to offset the incremental product development cost. Fourteen manufacturers responded to 
the challenge by submitting proposals. As a result of the competition, several of the manufacturers, although they 
failed to win the competition, have introduced efficiency improvements to their standard commercial models 
(CTI, 1998). 
11 See UNFCCC (1996) report on the in-depth review of the national communication of United States of 
America. 
12 Since environmental concerns were simply not a public issue in 1947 when GATT was signed, exploring the 
environmental exceptions to the general free trade requirements in GATT depends as much on interpretation as 
on the actual clauses (Charnovitz, 1991). Given the fact that a three-fourths vote of the entire membership is 
required for the membership to adopt legal interpretation of any WTO agreement (WTO, 1995), the above 




products” from unacceptable non-product related PPMs (processes and production methods) without 
opening the door to unacceptable abuses (Jackson, 1992, 2000; Schoenbaum, 1997).
13 Similarly, an 
exporting country may claim that the absence of climate change policies in an importing country poses 
de facto a competitiveness barrier to its export, and thus could be seen as an effective protectionist 
device. 
 
The existing WTO rules on subsidies are much needed for a variety of reasons and changing them 
may be undesirable. Close scrutiny of WTO rules is a necessary and imperative condition in order to 
avoid of trade conflicts that result from Kyoto Protocol implementation; but it may not be sufficient. In 
this regard, further analytical work to clarify the complex situations arising from the climate change 




III.   ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 
 
 
Standards refer to regulations stipulating, for example, the minimum energy efficiency 
standards for products. Standards of this sort are set by governments and are usually mandatory. Given 
that the perceived political costs of introducing standards are much lower than the costs of the 
introduction or raising of energy taxation, energy efficiency standards may be seen as more attractive 
and feasible (Brack  et al., 2000). Thus, it is conceivable that in attempting to fulfil their Kyoto 
obligations, Annex 1 governments may set high energy efficiency standards for products, such as 
automobiles sold in their countries, either domestically produced or imported. The result would be less 
energy consumed and fewer energy-related greenhouse gas emissions emitted into the atmosphere.  
 
In principle, this practice would not infringe on WTO rules if applied consistently with the 
principle of national treatment. Nevertheless, problems could arise if such regulations were designed 
in such a way as to effectively penalize foreign firms in favour of domestic ones. A potentially serious 
conflict has erupted in the context of fuel efficiency standards proposed by the Japanese Ministry of 
Transport to control CO2 emissions, allegedly as part of Japan’s policy to meet its Kyoto 
commitments. Such a proposal suggested lowering the rates of two of the eight taxes currently applied 
to vehicles in Japan for vehicles of small engine size and high fuel efficiency. In December 1998, 
European Union officials said that they would challenge Japan in the WTO if such new emission 
standards were implemented. Europeans carmakers claim that standards are actually based on the 
weight of vehicles, and that almost 90 per cent of European car sales in Japan fell into the medium- to 
heavyweight categories. Thus, in their view the planned Japanese rules could severely affect exports of 
European Union medium-range and luxury cars to the Japanese market, precisely a market segment 
where Europeans have a comparative advantage. At the same time, Japanese cars with higher fuel 
consumption rates would easily meet the standards.
14 On 11 January 1999, Japan pursued the issue 
                                                 
13 In dealing with the whole PPMs controversy, a distinction is drawn between product-related PPMs and non-
product related PPMs. Product-related PPMs refer to the characteristics of the final product, for example, the 
environmental impact of a product when it is used or disposed, whereas non-product related PPMs refer to the 
characteristics of the processes or methods in manufacturing a product or providing a service (OECD, 1997b). 
Discrimination based on how a product is produced has traditionally had a rough ride in the WTO. Under WTO 
rules, an imported product is not allowed to be treated differently to a “like product” (i.e. a product with the same 
physical characteristics) produced domestically, only on the ground of process and production method employed 
to produce the product. 
14 See European Carmakers to Challenge Japan at WTO, Journal of Commerce, 22 December 1998; and 
BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2, 18 January 1999, International Centre for Trade 




further by notifying the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee, indicating 
that by April 1999 it would introduce new energy efficiency standards for passenger cars.
15 Japan 
justified the measure as a means of promoting energy efficiency in order to cope with rising energy 
consumption and climate change concerns. It is worthy to mention that this potential “friction” 
between Japan and the European Union happened at the time when neither had ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. Both parties ratified in May 2002. 
 
In principle, WTO rules do not allow the unilateral setting of standards that are more trade-
restrictive than necessary. Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, for example, requires that technical 
regulations affecting imported products not be “prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to or with the 
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade”.
16 If, however, regulations are “not more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective”, they may be allowed under the TBT 
Agreement. Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement offers some flexibility to regulations introduced pursuant 
to a few “legitimate objectives”, which are defined as including “national security requirements, 
prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or 
the environment” (WTO, 1995). The question then would be to prove that a specific regulation is the 
least-trade restrictive and necessary to combat climate change. This could be done by, for example, 
establishing multilaterally agreed energy efficiency standards, given that Article 2.5 of the TBT 
Agreement states that a regulation is presumed not to contain any unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade if it is established in accordance with “relevant international standards”. 
 
Looking into a concrete dispute may help to further clarify the interpretation of the WTO-
consistency. In the “Auto Taxes Panel” raised under the GATT, the European Union challenged the 
United States Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) requirements (1994) and the United States “gas 
guzzler tax” on the basis that these laws had an adverse impact on European Union car manufacturers. 
CAFE penalizes car manufacturers that do not meet average efficiency standards for their sales in the 
United States. The gas-guzzler tax is levied on car models with fuel consumption levels below 22.5 miles 
per gallon. Both laws allow manufacturers to do some averaging, which arguably allows United States 
manufacturers to avoid the tax.
17 Given the limited lines of luxury models built by many European 
manufacturers, European carmakers would be unable to take full advantage of the averaging provisions 
and would as a result have been penalized and taxed. 
 
The panel upheld the gas-guzzler tax because it was applied equally to all cars, regardless of where 
they were manufactured, but not the CAFE standards. In analyzing the gas-guzzler tax, the panel did not 
consider cars which could run more than 22.5 miles per gallon as “like” cars to those that consume more 
and run under 22.5 miles per gallon, hence they could be treated differently under Article III of the GATT. 
On this, some analysts (e.g. Goldberg, 1995) think that this could “suggest that, in the future, trade 




                                                 
15 See WTO TBT Notification  G/TBT/Notif.99.3, 11 January 1999. 
16 Under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, to ensure technical regulations do not create unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade, technical regulations must “not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create” (WTO, 1995). 
17 CAFE allows manufacturers to average across their full product line. The gas guzzler tax allows manufacturers 
to average the fuel efficiency of cars within a “model type”, i.e. those with the same chassis and engine size.  
18  However, this should be interpreted with great caution because “GATT and WTO panels are not bound by 
previous panel decisions and have been known to reach diametrically opposite conclusions about identical 




In this panel ruling, it appears that “the panel seemed most concerned about the creation of 
categories of products based on origin and ownership. Thus, although foreign and domestic cars arguably 
are treated the same (or at least in parallel fashion), and despite the fact that the panel could not 
demonstrate that foreign cars suffer a greater disadvantage under the law than domestic cars, it found that 
the CAFE law violates GATT” (Goldberg, 1995) since it is specific to foreign cars sold in the United 
States market. The lesson for future unilateral measures is simple: distinctions based on a product’s origin, 
ownership, manufacturer, or importer should be avoided. It appears from the Auto Taxes case that there 
could be many WTO-consistent trade measures that a country can adopt unilaterally to implement its 
Kyoto Protocol commitments. The main question boils down to whether such measures are designed for, 
or result in, a discriminatory protection of domestic production. If they do not, they would not transgress 
WTO rules. 
 
An alternative and less conflicting route other than unilateral measures in order to comply with 
Kyoto Protocol targets is the implementation of energy efficiency standards by Annex 1 Parties in 
concert.
19 From a trade perspective, a harmonized approach is clearly advantageous. First, harmonized 
measures are less likely to be discriminatory, at least between the Parties involved since negotiators would 
seek to make them trade-neutral to gain the maximum number of adherents to the agreement. Goldberg 
(1995) argues however that “the history of the CAFE law suggests that the requirement of trade neutrality 
could make implementation by national legislatures more difficult”. Second, future WTO panels may 
favour regulations or standards that are explicitly mandated and multilaterally agreed upon by the post-
Kyoto climate change regime.
20 Indeed, as was discussed, Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement provides that 
a technical regulation which is adopted in accordance with a relevant international standard “shall be 
presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade”.  
 
The attraction to harmonized energy efficiency standards is evident. The harmonization of 
standards would lower the costs of information on, and adjustments to, different requirements involved in 
exporting to different markets (OECD, 1996).
21 However, experience shows that the negotiation of 
international standards is usually a long, if not fruitless process which require considerable application. 
For example, in the European Union measures to promote energy efficiency have been under serious 
discussion since mid-1970s, but only in the early 1990s did the European Union succeed in introducing 
energy labelling, and the first energy efficiency standards are only now beginning to enter into force 
                                                 
19 To some extent, the UNFCCC already requires such a harmonization. Specifically, Article 4.2(e)(i) requires 
Parties to coordinate their economic and administrative instruments as appropriate. However, it is not clear how 
strong this mandate is. It seems unlikely that it provides a basis to challenge unilateral measures like the United 
States CAFE standards or the above Japanese proposal for fuel efficiency standards for vehicles.  
20 In this regard, it is worth mentioning the recent Shrimp-Turtle dispute. To address the decline of sea turtles 
around the world, in 1989 the United States Congress enacted Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 to authorize 
embargoes on shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology harmful to sea turtles. The United States 
was challenged in the WTO by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand in October 1996, after embargoes were 
levelled against them. A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel was established in April 1997 to hear the case. The 
Panel found that the United States failed to approach the complainant nations in serious multilateral negotiations 
before enforcing the United States law against those nations, and thus ruled against the United States. The United 
States appealed the ruling. The WTO Appellate Body reiterated this concern, and pointed to a 1996 regional 
agreement reached at the United States initiation, namely the Inter-American Convention on Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles, as evidence of the feasibility of such an approach (WTO, 1998; Berger, 1999). 
Here, the Appellate Body again advanced the standing of multilateral environmental treaties. Thus, it follows 
that this and other existing trade disputes at the WTO have indicated clear preference for actions taken pursuant 
to multilateral agreement and negotiated through international cooperative arrangements, like the Kyoto Protocol 
in the case of dealing with the global climate change problem.  
21 For example, the development of energy efficiency standards in the United States has been led by individual 
states (particularly California). After a number of states had introduced such standards, the manufacturers tended 
to accept the need to produce more efficient products, and indeed in some cases started to support the 
development of harmonized federal standards so as to avoid the administrative costs and complexity of meeting 




(Brack et al., 1999). Even for an optimistic estimate, the time needed for research, to plan and negotiate 
common standards at Annex 1 country level could take about 5 years (Mullins, 1996).  Moreover, 
common standards may not always b e appropriate for different countries. If it is difficult for European 
Union member countries at comparable economic and technological levels to harmonize their energy 
standards, the prospects for the harmonization of energy efficiency standards among Annex 1 countries 
seem remote. Even if common standards had eventually been internationally established, they are 
expected to be driven down towards the lowest common denominator among the countries involved. 
Annex 1 Parties would, nevertheless, be entitled under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement to set their own 
higher standards if they are able to prove that international standards would be inappropriate to achieve 
the targeted climate objective. 
 
Alternatively, instead of attempting the wide-ranging harmonization of performance standards, a 
strategy of harmonizing procedural standards could be pursued. Such a strategy would attempt to set 
internationally agreed guidelines which need to be respected when defining performance standards. The 
ISO 14000 series of environmental management standards is a good example of voluntary procedural 




IV.   ECO-LABELS 
 
 
Eco-labelling refers to the use of a seal on a product to identify it as environmentally preferable 
to its alternative in the same category. Its purpose is to promote the production, consumption and 
disposal of more environmentally friendly products. Eco-labelling gives the consumer the choice of 
whether to buy a product contributing to environmental degradation or to buy more environmentally 
friendly alternative. As a consequence, producers are encouraged to apply for the eco-label in order to 
avoid losing market share. By certifying that certain products involve exceptionally low greenhouse 
gas emissions in their production process, eco-labelling would provide governments with a useful tool 
to use consumer preference to help meet their Kyoto emissions targets.  
 
Its voluntary nature makes eco-labelling an attractive alternative to costly regulatory measures. 
Existing eco-labelling schemes are usually designed to apply to a small percentage of products in a 
product category, which represent no more than 30 per cent and no less than 5 per cent of the market 
share (OECD, 1997a). These schemes indicate the overall environmental qualities of such eco-labelled 
products in order to encourage consumers to purchase them. Once a large proportion of products 
within a group are eco-labelled, the criteria for eco-labelling should be revised to increase their 
stringency of environmental quality. All previous eco-labelled products have to apply for the eco-label 
once again, and only those that meet the new revised criteria can remain eco-labelled. This constant 
upward revision of environmental criteria is considered essential to ensure continuously improved 
environmental performance (OECD, 1997a).  
 
The eco-label criteria for such schemes as the German Blue Angel, the Japanese Eco-Mark, and 
the Canadian Environmental Choice Programme aim generally to promote products that reduce 
environmental damages during the use and disposal phases of the products (OECD, 1997a). However, 
given that eco-labels are increasingly based on a life-cycle analysis of environmental effects of 




spread has rightfully given rise to fears and concerns, especially amongst developing countries, about 
their potential trade effects.  
 
One trade aspect of particular concern refers to the use of distinctions between products based 
on their PPMs. From the international trade perspective, distinctions based on how a product is 
produced bring up the question of whether such eco-labels are covered by the TBT Agreement, or are 
in effect a technical regulation. Since eco-labels are considered to be voluntary standards, it can be 
said that eco-labels are subject to the provisions of the TBT Agreement on standards. In this case, 
climate change-related eco-labels would need to adhere to the WTO’s Code of Good Practice, which 
governs the preparation, adoption and application of such standards. Although some trade analysts 
(e.g. Tietje, 1995) argue that the TBT Agreement covers only standards that concern product 
characteristics and incorporated PPMs, there is a continuing controversy in the WTO on whether the 
TBT Agreement covers unincorporated PPMs  – those that are not reflected in final product 
characteristics (OECD, 1996; Assunção, 1998a; Cosbey and Cameron, 1999).  
 
Another concern relates to the determinations of the category of eco-labelled products, and the 
procedures of establishing eco-labels. In selecting eco-labelled products, it is likely that the country 
establishing the eco-label scheme could favour domestic producers by failing to include similar or 
competing products from foreign producers, thus placing imports at a comparative disadvantage vis-à-
vis the domestic products. Similarly, in developing eco-labels criteria, the country does not take into 
consideration the environmental conditions and preferences of the exporting countries. For instance, 
the relative abundance of environmental endowment in the foreign producer’s country may be more 
capable of assimilating a given quantity of pollution than the environment of the importing country 
that establishes the eco-label scheme, although the impact of producing such products on the 
environment of the producer’s country is perfectly acceptable. Consequently, the eco-label may 
constitute a de facto non-tariff barrier for the foreign products that do not comply with the eco-label 
criteria to get access to the importing country market. This market access barrier may be particularly 
worrisome and detrimental to developing countries because they often do not have the technical  or 
financial capacity to adapt their PPMs to those required in the importing countries. In fact, this was 
cited as causing potential trade barriers to products produced in developing countries by a number of 
parties (including India, the Republic of Korea, Morocco and Egypt) in the negotiations on the Kyoto 
Protocol. Again wary countries like Egypt see eco-labels as part of the market access question when 
the European Union and other nations were pushing for the inclusion of eco-labelling on the post-
Doha agenda of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  
 
To date, the only eco-labels that have been developed for product categories of particular export 
interest to developing countries are the eco-labels for textiles (OECD, 1997a). For example, the 
Nordic Swan and the European Union eco-label for textiles contain criteria on the manufacturing 
process, such as the use of pesticides in the growing of cotton and the use of harmful substances 
during the process. Given the fact that developing countries have not committed themselves to legally 
binding greenhouse gas emissions targets as their developed counterparts have done, developed 
countries might use an eco-label as the criterion to purchase products from developing countries in the 
future. Consequently, this limited coverage of products of particular export interest to developing 
countries may change. This, combined with lack of participation and consultation of developing 
countries when eco-labelled products are selected and criteria for eco-labelling are established, could 
adversely affect developing countries’ ability to export their products to developed countries. This 
shows again that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will most likely be a significant source of 






V.   GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
 
 
Among OECD member countries, government procurement expenditures involve extremely 
diverse products and services and account for 8 to 25 per cent of GDP (OECD, 2000). The potential 
for public purchasing decisions to affect the environment is therefore considerable. By supporting 
innovation in, and purchasing environmentally preferable products and services government 
procurement potentially plays a crucial role in achieving reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. This 
explains why those committed to effective climate change policies generally support greener public 
purchasing.  
 
Trade issues, in general should not be expected to arise in the “greening” of public purchasing, 
provided that the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and national treatment are fully 
respected. However, given that in practice public procurement differs widely among countries, there 
are concerns that green public purchasing schemes could add an extra layer of complexity to 
purchasing decisions, therefore reducing transparency and distorting free competition (Cameron and 
Buck, 1998; OECD, 1999). From this perspective, green public purchasing schemes could provide a 
pretext for undermining the WTO rules.  
 
In order to green public purchases, the environmental characteristics of the products to be 
procured have first to be technically specified.
22 Thus, specifying such characteristics is an essential 
part of any tendering process. Concerns about trade effects are raised with respect to differential 
treatment between local and foreign suppliers in the specifications in tenders. For example, by 
emphasizing recycled content in the specifications in tenders for paper purchases, the criteria could 
favour domestic producers who are predominately based on recycled content over foreign producers 
whose products have a higher virgin paper content. Another example relates to transport-related 
specifications in tenders, e.g. specifying the mode of freight or limits on emissions for delivering 
tendered products, the local purchasing entities gives a preference for locally produced products. 
Although this practice is not yet widespread, it is potentially relevant to trade policy concerns given 
the trend towards decentralization of purchasing decisions.  
 
Another trade aspect of particular concern is the fact that government procurement-related 
purchasing specifications often include production-related requirements. The national treatment 
provisions prohibit differentiation between otherwise “like products” on the basis of PPM-related 
                                                 
22 In this regard, a  distinction can be drawn between negative and positive approaches to the framing of 
specifications. Negative approaches aim to specify what are currently in use to eliminate those specifications that 
effectively hamper efforts to procure environmentally preferable products and services. By contrast, positive 
approaches aim to identify certain characteristics of products and services to ensure that procurement officers 





23 Thus, if a government treats differently imports that emit more 
greenhouse gas emissions in their production than their like domestic products, it could face a sanction 
under the WTO rules. A case in point would be the preference for electricity generated from 
hydropower and discrimination against those from coal-fired power. It is worth noting that the main 
body of international rules and procedures governing the relationship between green government 
procurement and free trade is currently found in the Agreement on Government Procurement 1994 
(AGP). The AGP is one of the plurilateral agreements included in Annex 4 to the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO. Consequently, WTO signatories are not required to join the AGP as a 
precondition to WTO membership. Because the AGP is an agreement outside the WTO rules, 
however, it is still a matter of debate whether the AGP can allow distinguishing products and services 
to be procured based on their non-product related PPMs. Some analysts, for example, Cameron and 
Buck (1998), have argued that the wording of Article VI.1 of the AGP does not explicitly exclude the 
use of technical specifications that make reference to non-product related PPMs. Moreover, they think 
that reference to non-product related PPMs would be in line with Article VI.2(a) of the AGP, as 
technical specifications that refer to certain aspects of the life-cycle performance of a product or 
service are likely to be in terms of performance rather than design. If the reasoning held, public 
procurement based on, e.g. the maximal energy consumption or the overall greenhouse gas emissions 
during the life cycle of a product would be allowed. Other analysts add that as the AGP has only a 
very limited partnership, it could be modified to reflect “climate change” considerations.  
 
The third aspect of trade concern is related to the practice of using eco-labels to designate 
environmentally preferable products for public procurement. Experience shows that public 
procurement has given a strong impetus to the increasing success of the eco-label schemes, such as the 
German Blue Angel (OECD, 1997a). Given that purchasing officers have mostly neither the time nor 
the expertise to gather all the information needed to substantiate specifications, it is relatively easy to 
refer to existing eco-labels (i.e. design the greener products with an existing eco-label). But such a 
practice raises concerns about the possible over-reliance on eco-labels at the expense of objective 
consideration of underlying criteria (OECD, 1999). Where adherence to an eco-labelling scheme is 
specified in tender documentation, the compliance costs associated with qualifying for the eco-label 
might be higher for foreign firms, especially for small and medium-size enterprises in developing 
countries. Moreover, the inability of producers to ensure that the materials used are produced in 
accordance with the eco-label criteria may present further hurdles for the participation of foreign 
producers in a public tender (OECD, 1999).
24 In order not to  reduce the chances of purchasing 
                                                 
23 In the above-mentioned Shrimp-Turtle dispute, the Dispute Settlement Panel held that the United States 
shrimp embargo was a class of measures of PPMs type and had a serious threat to the multilateral trading system 
because it conditioned market access on the conservation policies of foreign countries. Thus, it cannot be 
justified under GATT Article XX. However, the WTO Appellate Body overruled the Panel’s reasoning. The 
Appellate Body held that a WTO member requires from exporting countries compliance, or adoption of, certain 
policies prescribed by the importing country does not render the measure inconsistent with the WTO obligation. 
Although the Appellate Body still found that the United States shrimp embargo was not justified under GATT 
Article XX, the decision was not on ground that the United States sea turtle law itself was not inconsistent with 
GATT. Rather, the ruling was on ground that the application of the law constituted “arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination” between WTO members (WTO, 1998). Therefore, some analysts (e.g. Ahn, 1999) suggest that 
the Appellate Body’s ruling implies that requiring other WTO members to adopt a comparable regulatory 
program may not be inconsistent per se with the WTO obligation. It should be pointed out, though, that there is 
no universally accepted interpretation of the Appellate Body decision (IPCC, 2001). Other analysts (e.g. Jackson, 
2000) argue that such a conclusion that PPMs no longer violate WTO by their very nature is premature legally or 
has been insufficiently debated and tested in the scientific literature. 
24 A study on the impacts of the EU eco-labelling scheme on Brazilian exports of textiles found that there was 
the severe difficulty complying with the criteria for the use of pesticides during the manufacturing process 
(OECD, 1997a). Although the use of pesticides in cotton grown in Brazil is low, the imports of cotton are 
increasing. It is very difficult for Brazilian textile producers to certify that the cotton they import was not 




imported products, the purchasing authorities should encourage to use the eco-label’s underlying 
criteria and information gathered on the particular environmental reference points, rather than the eco-
labels themselves. In other words, eco-labels are regarded as an additional source of information, not 
as a pre-requisite for participation in government procurement. 
 
Fourth, trade concerns would emerge if the procurement rules require the suppliers’ green 
credentials as a condition for participating in government procurement bids. The United States 
Departments of Energy and Defense have been cited as considering ISO 14001 certification as a 
prerequisite for qualifying suppliers (UNCTAD, 1997). If the eligibility for a supplier to sell to a 
public entity is conditional on its compliance with an environmental management system, whether ISO 
14001 or EMAS (the European Union Eco-audit and Management Scheme), this might be considered 
to amount to differential treatment of what are in fact “like products” (OECD, 1999). There are two 
ways to avoid potential trade effects of the specification. The first approach is that the purchaser may 
refer to, or demand adherence to, the specified environmental management standards, but may not do 
without adding “or equivalent”. Another approach is to apply the greener criteria only to products 
themselves, without reference to the environmental credentials of potential suppliers. It should be 
pointed out that environmental management systems are just standards on company practices. A 
company having a certified environmental management system does not necessarily mean that its 
products are greener than those not having such a certification. From this perspective, conditioning the 
suppliers’ eligibility to participate in government procurement bids on their green credentials may lead 
to the choice of high carbon-emitting products from the suppliers complying with an environmental 
management system over low carbon-emitting “like products” from those not having a certified 








In recent years, both the European Union and the United States attempted to implement a carbon 
tax, raising the price of energy to incorporate the costs of environmental externalities associated with its 
use, and both failed. But there is no doubt that compliance with the Kyoto emissions reduction targets 
might make many developed countries have a second thought on this option. 
 
By definition, a carbon tax is an excise tax imposed on the carbon emitted in the manufacturing 
process of a product according to the carbon content of fossil fuels and is thus restricted to carbon-
based fuels only. If the goal is to reduce CO2 emissions, a carbon tax is preferred to an energy tax due 
to its greater cost-effectiveness (Zhang, 1997). The reason is that a carbon tax equalizes the marginal 
cost of CO2 abatement across fuels and therefore satisfies the condition for minimizing the global cost 
of reducing CO2 emissions. This implies that implementation of an energy tax will lead to poor target 
achievement or else to unnecessarily high costs as compared with a carbon tax.  25 
 
If imposed unilaterally, a carbon tax would raise the prices of energy and  of those products 
whose production gives rise to the large amount of CO2 emissions, and thus has potentially important 
implications for the international competitiveness of domestic products, particularly energy-intensive 
                                                 
25   Please note that a Carbon tax can be easily converted into a CO2 tax, given the fact that a tonne of Carbon 




products. Although international competitiveness is not necessarily reduced over the long term by 
higher energy prices, in certain industries, the effects of introducing a unilateral carbon tax may indeed 
be serious in the short term.  This is so because it imposes a “penalty” on domestic producers who 
could face imports that may not have such a tax levied on them, while at the same time having to 
compete with similarly untaxed products on the international market. Although one solution could be 
to impose the tax on imports at the border and refund on exports, this issue has become the main 
stumbling block for the introduction of energy/carbon taxes (Barde, 1997), and thus has been a 
constant concern to policy makers. 
 
Generally speaking, competitiveness at the firm level is the ability of a firm to maintain or even 
increase international or domestic market shares and profitability.
26 A firm’s competitiveness is 
influenced both by ‘micro’ factors, such as cost structure, product quality, trademark, service and 
logistical networks, and by ‘macro’ factors, such as exchange rates, trade rules and political regime 
stability (Baron and ECON-Energy, 1997). A carbon tax affects a firm’s competitiveness by changing 
its relative production costs. For example, if a firm makes intensive use of energy, ceteris paribus, 
then imposing a carbon tax will increase its production cost relative to those less energy-intensive 
firms in the short term. Thus, it would experience a decline in competitiveness, whereas less energy-
intensive firms would obtain a relative  cost advantage in the short term. The changes in relative 
competitive positions would lead to ‘winners’ as well as ‘losers’ from the imposition of carbon/energy 
tax. Not surprisingly, potential ‘losers’ lobby strongly against the imposition of carbon/energy taxes. 
They even threaten to relocate their business activities to those countries that have relatively lax 
environmental standards, if such a tax were put in place. This raises the question: do environmental 
taxes and regulations hurt firms’ competitiveness so badly that they are forced to move to pollution 
havens? There is growing literature on this topic, and the existing studies on trade implications of 
environmental regulations might give us some indications. 
 
Grossman and Krueger (1993), for example, have examined whether pollution abatement costs 
influenced the patterns of the United States bilateral trade and investment with Mexico and found that “the 
available evidence does not support the hypothesis that cross-country differences in environmental 
standards are an important determinant of the global patterns of international trade.” Jaffe et al. (1995) 
review and analyse over 100 studies on the potential effects of environmental regulations on the 
competitiveness of American industry, and conclude that “studies attempting to measure the effect of 
environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows, and plant-location decisions have produced 
estimates that are either small, statistically insignificant or not robust to tests of model specification.”. The 
Annex 1 Expert Group on the UNFCCC (Baron and ECON-Energy, 1997) undertook a static analysis of 
the cost increases from a tax of US$100 per tonne of carbon on four energy-intensive industries (iron and 
steel, non-ferrous metals, paper and pulp, and chemical products) in the OECD countries. These sectors 
represent 3 to 7 per cent of GDP and 1 to 4 per cent of labour force in these countries.  As shown in table 
1, the average cost increase measured as percentage of total production value differs among countries and 
sectors, but is generally low (below 2 per cent) except for Australia and Canada. This analysis concludes 
that other factors affecting price levels, such as exchange rate variations, may well dwarf the price effects 





                                                 








Effective and nominal tax rates (1998) in selected sectors in Sweden, Denmark and Norway 
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Source:  Baranzini et al. (2000). 
Table 1 
Selected OECD countries’ cost increase 
a from a tax of US$100 per tonne of carbon 
as percentage of production value  



































































Source:  Baron and ECON-Energy (1997).  
a  The figures include carbon emissions from electricity generation sector and from process emissions 
in aluminium production. Numbers in parentheses indicate cost increase when the carbon tax is 





However, these findings are not necessarily going to be the case of energy/carbon taxes in the 
future for the following reasons.  
 
First, environmental regulations and taxes applied to date have been relatively modest, and they 
fall well short of the levels required to  achieve the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective of “stabilizing 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”. That is, if carbon taxes were used as the sole means of meeting 
the Kyoto emissions obligations, the level of the taxes would be very high and could thus have 
significant implications for competitiveness.  
 
Second, in countries, such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden where carbon/energy taxes are 
already applied, energy-intensive industries are generally exempted, either totally or partially, from 
such taxes. This leads to a large gap between effective and nominal tax rates as shown in table 2. 
Moreover, even if not totally exempted, the revenues from such taxes are fully recycled back to the 
affected industries, for example, in the form of grants for energy saving investments and cuts in 
employers’ social security contributions (cf. Baranzini et al., 2000). 
 
The analysis of potentially high carbon taxes underlines the importance of mitigating their 
competitiveness effects in designing such taxes. One commonly used device is to grant energy-
intensive industries a lower tax rate than for example households, or even to exempt these industries 
entirely. For example, the unimplemented CEC (1992) proposal
27 provided for exemptions for the six 
energy-intensive industries, such as iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, cement, glass, and 
pulp and paper. However, since a carbon tax is intended to fall most heavily on the products of carbon-
intensive industries, the exclusion of these industries from coverage of the carbon tax on the ground of 
competitiveness reduces the effectiveness of the carbon tax in achieving its intended objective of 
reducing CO2 emissions.  
 
Another means to reduce adverse competitiveness effects is through border tax adjustments 
(BTAs) whereby exporting countries rebate taxes levied on the products when these are exported, 
while the importing countries impose the taxes on imported products at the border that have not been 
subjected to a similar level of taxes levied on their domestic products. Such adjustments enable a 
country to tax its domestic energy-consuming industries for internal purposes while preserving its 
competitiveness internationally. It also allows its exports to compete in untaxed markets abroad, while 
ensuring their competitive advantages domestically by taxing imports up to the same level. This kind 
of BTAs reflects the application to products of the destination principle, which suggests that products 
should be taxed in the country where they are consumed and not in the country where they are 
produced unless they are also consumed there. 
 
From a WTO p erspective, BTAs, if adopted, should not be used to provide an artificial 
competitive advantage for domestic products. Thus, border taxes should not be in excess of taxes on 
“like products” manufactured and sold domestically. Clearly, such adjustments are intended to ensure 
that internal taxes on products are trade-neutral. BTAs have been used in the United States in two 
                                                 
27 As part of its comprehensive strategy to control CO2 emissions and increase energy efficiency, the European 
Commission proposed as early as in 1992 that member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$3 per barrel oil 
equivalent in 1993, which would be raised in real terms by US$1 every year to reach US$10 per barrel in 2000. 
After, the tax rate would remain constant at US$10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates were allocated across 




important instances of environmental excise taxes: the Superfund Chemical Exercises (Superfund Tax) 
and the Ozone-Depleting Chemicals (ODC) Tax. With a modest rate of US$4.87 per tonne, the 
Superfund Tax was designed to place the burden of such cleanup on those responsible for generating 
wastes, but was not intended to influence behaviour through the price system. On the other hand, the 
ODC Tax aimed to harness market forces to promote the identification of substitutes for the taxed 
chemicals, and thus was intended to influence behaviour through the price system. This BTA policy 
turned out to be effective both in raising the price of taxed chemicals and in discouraging their 
production (Hoerner, 1998). 
 
When considering BTAs for carbon taxes, it is necessary to distinguish between energy 
products (e.g. coal, oil, and gas) from final products (e.g. cars, chemical products). As expected, the 
application of BTAs to energy products is relatively straightforward. The GATT/WTO rules allow the 
same taxes to be imposed on imported like (energy) products, as well as the rebate of indirect taxes on 
exported domestic products – as long as there is no discrimination against foreign energy products. 
However, the situation becomes much more complicated when the products to be imported or 
exported are not the energy products themselves, but a product whose production or distribution 
involves the use of taxed energy inputs. It would appear that such BTA adjustments for imports on the 
basis of their PPMs is in direct conflict with the GATT/WTO principles (see, for example, Stewardson 
(1994); Zhang (1998); Brack et al. (1999)). Moreover, there would be formidable technical difficulties in 
identifying the appropriate energy/carbon contents embodied in traded products unless exporting 
countries that do not impose energy/carbon taxes are willing to cooperate in certifying how the products 
are produced.
28 In the absence of any information regarding the carbon content of the products from 
exporting countries, importing countries could, for instance, prescribe the tax rates based on their 
domestically predominant method of production for the imported products.
29  
 
In addition to being methodologically challenging, there is the question of whether a tax levied on 
a product based on the carbon emitted in its production should be regarded as a direct tax or an indirect 
tax. This would further complicate applying BTAs to imports since GATT rules prescribe that the only 
BTAs eligible are those levied directly on products, such as excise or value added taxes. Taxes not 
directly levied on products are not eligible for adjustment, such as social security charges and payroll 
taxes. Given the fact that greenhouse gas emissions occurred during the manufacturing process are not 
really embodied in the product itself when it reaches the border, it is not at all obvious that such a tax 
would be considered as a direct tax (Cosbey and Cameron, 1999).  
 
The potential effects on competitiveness can also be attenuated if the introduction of carbon 
taxes is announced in advance, phased-in gradually and increased over time. This will help to reduce 
economic effects of the tax by avoiding unduly early retirements of existing infrastructures and, at the 
same time, send a steady but strong price signal for a shift away from carbon-intensive choices. For 
example, the above ODC Tax in the United States was phased-in gradually over a period of years. For 
                                                 
28 The use of a de minimis floor could substantially reduce the number of products that would be covered in the 
case of energy/carbon taxes, so that BTAs should be avoided where the tax is trivial percentage of the price. For 
example, in the case of the above Superfund Tax, BTAs are limited to primary products for which the share of 
taxable chemicals in production is at least 50 per cent, while in the case of the ODC Tax a de minimis rule is 
applied to non-listed products (Hoerner, 1998). However, the desirability of the use of a de minimis floor to 
lower substantial administrative burden must be weighted against the environmental effectiveness of 
energy/carbon taxes.  
29 This practice is by no means without foundation. For example, the United States Secretary of the Treasury has 
adopted the approach in the tax on imported toxic chemicals under the Superfund Tax (Poterba and Rotemberg, 
1995; Hoerner, 1998). Nevertheless, such a practice seems very hard to justify in the case of energy/carbon taxes, 
given the wide range of technologies in use around the world and very different energy resource endowments and 




most important ODCs, the tax is currently more than five times higher than its initial level (Hoerner, 
1998). 
 
Of course, another means of mitigating competitiveness effects would be through the 
international harmonization of energy/carbon taxes. Up to now, our discussion has been restricted to 
domestic carbon tax. However, even if domestic emission reduction targets are achieved in cost-efficient 
ways, for example, through a domestic carbon tax, a global cost-efficient emission reduction target can 
only be achieved if CO2 emissions are distributed among countries in such a way that the marginal cost 
of abatement is equalized among countries. If an international carbon tax could be put in place to achieve 
this global cost efficiency, it will help avoid applying complex board tax adjustments among the 
countries where the common tax is imposed. However, the international harmonization of energy/carbon 
taxes is faced with some fundamental problems. For instance, the above mentioned CEC proposal for 
harmonization at the European Union level failed to gain the unanimous support of its member states, 
mainly because some member states (e.g. the United Kingdom) opposed an increase in the fiscal 
competence of the European Community and thus opposed the introduction at a European Union level 
of a new tax on the ground of fiscal sovereignty (Delbeke, 1997; Bill, 1999). Even if it had been 
agreed at the European Union level, competitiveness concerns from the outside of the European Union 
suggest that similar actions, especially in the United States and Japan, would have been undertaken. 
However, given the political difficulties in introducing carbon taxes in countries such as the United 
States, the prospects for the harmonization of carbon taxes at the OECD level seem remote, let alone 
across a wider group of countries. Moreover, the initial difference in energy prices further complicates 
the harmonization of carbon tax (Zhang, 1997; Eizenstat, 1998). Existing initial distortions in price 
regulations, taxation, national monopolies, barriers to trade and so on across countries have led to great 
differences in energy prices both between fuels and across countries, which in turn make tax 
harmonization virtually impossible (cf. Hoeller and Coppel, 1992). Thus, it is clear that while the 
harmonization of energy/carbon taxes at the OECD and global levels seems to be theoretically the ideal 





VII.   CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Kyoto Protocol marks an important first step towards internalizing the climate change 
externality and will potentially represent the most commendable effort by the international community 
to put the concept of sustainable development into practice. Measures taken by Annex 1 countries to 
meet greenhouse gas emissions targets will certainly have a bearing on world trade. They will affect 
the costs of production of traded products and therefore their competitive positions in the world 
market. Such an interface between trade policy and climate policy calls for policy co-ordination in a 
sufficiently coherent way. 
 
Given the complexity in policy solutions required to tackle the global climate change problem, 
their clear trade and investment implications and the fact that amending WTO rules seems unlikely, it 
is important to consider ways to advance the Climate Change Convention and Kyoto Protocol 
objectives without compromising development aspirations through trade promotion. In this sense, this 
paper argues that there might be a need to revisit and eventually strengthen languages in Article 3.5 of 




with a view to enhancing coherence between trade, climate change and development policies. In so 
doing, it seems imperative that governments and policy-makers have a better understanding of the 
potential conflict between the existing WTO trade regime and the emerging climate regime. 
 
In dealing with transboundary and global environmental problems such as climate change, 
policies and measures adopted through multilateral negotiation processes have better chances to be 
WTO-consistent and thus avoid unnecessary conflicts and trade disputes, although the question 
remains on how the WTO could apply its rules with respect to a specific trade-related measure in a 
multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) when one WTO member country is not a party to such 
MEA but is affected by these measures. Indeed, the GATT and WTO panels have repeatedly made 
reference to multilateral solutions to environmental problems, while the WTO Committee on Trade 
and Environment has reiterated over the years its endorsement to multilateral solutions based on 
international co-operation and consensus as the best and most effective way to tackle environmental 
problems of a transboundary or global nature.  
 
More recently, paragraph 31(i) of the Doha Declaration calls for negotiations on "the relationship 
between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in MEAs. The negotiations shall be 
limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in 
question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party the 
MEA in question". It remains to be seen how this new mandate to CTE will evolve. 
 
Experience with existing MEAs
30 shows that trade measures agreed upon within the MEA itself 
may not necessarily lead to a trade dispute between WTO members. On the contrary, there is a much 
greater chance  of disputes arising from unilateral domestic measures introduced to fulfil MEA 
obligations
31. This possibility of conflict may well arise in implementing the Kyoto Protocol. As 
discussed in the paper, policy responses to meet the Kyoto emissions targets will require a 
fundamental change in the way that energy is produced and the way it is used, and thus will essentially 
centre on greenhouse gas levels emitted by energy-using PPMs. This raises concern about trade 
implications of the whole PPMs controversy. Moreover, it is highly likely that Annex 1 governments 
with differentiated legal and political systems might pursue these policies in such a way as to unfairly 
favour domestic producers over foreign ones. Consequently, these domestic climate policies might 
have the potential to bring countries into conflict with their WTO obligations. In many cases, however, 
such conflicts are not so intractable as to threaten the integrity of either the Kyoto Protocol or the 
WTO rules. Provided that WTO rules are carefully scrutinized at the time Annex 1 governments take 
measures to achieve the required reductions in emissions, these conflicts can be avoided or at least 
minimized. 
 
One strategy of avoiding the potential for conflict between the climate regime and the WTO rules 
is to pursue multilaterally agreed, WTO-consistent measures. Given that the TBT Agreement text gives a 
regulation that had been adopted and is pursuant to international standards a “presumption of consistency” 
with its disciplines, it seems logical to conclude that measures taken pursuant to recommendations or 
mandates of the Climate Change Convention would certainly be more acceptable than measures taken 
unilaterally. This can be translated into a strong plea for multilateralism, which is a fundamental principle 
                                                 
30 Such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, and the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 
31 The CITES, for example, explicitly allows its Parties to take stricter measures at the national level than those 




in the world trade regime. In this regard, although the prospects for the harmonization of performance 
standards and carbon taxes among Annex 1 countries seem remote, there is a much stronger case for 
attempting to harmonize procedural standards and procedures of establishing eco-labels. This would lower 
the costs of information on, and adjustments to, different requirements involved in exporting to different 
markets, thus promoting international trade. 
 
The establishment of a joint WTO/UNFCCC working group  – specifically one focusing on 
greater coherence between trade, climate change and development policy – could be an important step 
to help maximize synergies, while minimizing the potential for conflict.
32 This working group would 
address, for example, specific issues such as an acceptable border tax adjustment mechanism for 
Kyoto-related carbon taxes or a non-binding Understanding on the interpretation of GATT Article 
8.2(c) in its present or future form, among others. Unlike the Uruguay Round group with a mandate to 
examine the functioning of the GATT system, this joint working group could focus on discussions on 
the technical aspects and trade implications of specific measures and flexibility mechanisms 
envisioned in the implementation phase of the Kyoto Protocol. This would bring the consideration of 
specific climate policies and their resulting trade effects to a multilateral level and, at the same time, 
ensure their close consistency with the WTO rules, thus maximizing the WTO’s contributions t o 
sustainable development. 
                                                 
32 In this regard, it is worth noting that similar successful joint working groups have been established in the past, 
for example, between the UNFCCC and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Such working 
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